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Mind, Brain, and Free Will, Richard Swinburne’s stimulating new 
book, covers a great deal of territory. I’ll focus on some of the positions 
Swinburne defends in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers are 
likely to have reservations about the arguments he uses to defend them, 
and others will think his basic position is unmotivated. My goal in this 
brief discussion is to articulate some of the reasons why.
I. SWINBURNE’S ARGUMENT FOR PROPERTY DUALISM
Swinburne defends substance dualism, the claim that we are pure mental 
substances, ones that have only pure mental properties essentially. Pure 
mental properties are properties whose instantiation does not entail the 
instantiation of any physical properties. The property of seeing a desk 
is an  impure mental property on Swinburne’s view since necessarily 
someone can see a  desk only if he or she is causally affected by one, 
and being causally affected by a desk is a physical property. Seeming to 
see a desk, however, entails no such condition; I can seem to see a desk 
even if there is no desk causally affecting me. A property P is mental, 
according to Swinburne, exactly if a  substance S which instantiates P 
necessarily has privileged access to P’s instantiation. If P is mental, then 
S can in principle know that he or she instantiates P in the same ways 
other substances know it, but there will be an  additional way that S 
knows that P is instantiated, namely by experiencing it. Properties that 
are not mental are either physical or neutral. Physical properties are ones 
to which necessarily a  substance does not have privileged access, and 
neutral properties are ones to which some substances have privileged 
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access but others don’t (disjunctive properties such as the property 
of being in pain or weighing 50kg are examples; both I  and the desk 
instantiate this property, but I have privileged access to its instantiation 
and the desk does not).
Swinburne argues that mental and physical properties are distinct. 
This follows a  priori, he says, from his definitions of ‘mental’ and 
‘physical’ in conjunction with his account of properties. Properties, 
according to Swinburne, are universals, and they are abundant: any 
predicate whatsoever, it seems, picks out a property, and two properties 
are identical exactly if their informative designators are logically 
equivalent (this is no slip of the tongue: Swinburne is quite serious about 
stating conditions under which two substances, or two properties, or 
two events are the same, and by this he appears to mean numerically 
the same; although he does not endeavour to explain how two things 
can be one). An informative designator of some substance, property, or 
event, X, is a rigid designator of X that expresses X’s nature or essence, 
the conditions metaphysically necessary and sufficient for X being what 
it is. If ‘red’ is an informative designator, then the criteria for correctly 
applying it include the conditions that are metaphysically necessary and 
sufficient for being red. If those criteria are not logically equivalent to the 
criteria for correctly applying, say, ‘reflects such-and-such wavelengths 
of light’, then being red and reflecting such-and-such wavelengths of 
light must be different properties. This is in fact the case, says Swinburne, 
for knowing that something reflects such-and-such wavelengths of light 
does not entail that it looks a certain way to most people. The latter is 
an additional fact about an object that goes beyond its reflecting such-
and-such wavelengths of light. It is thus true a  priori that red is not 
identical to reflecting such-and-such wavelengths of light. It is also true 
a  priori that redness does not supervene on reflecting such-and-such 
wavelengths of light, for it is logically possible that objects which reflect 
such-and-such wavelengths of light might look differently to us. What 
is true of red, according to Swinburne, is also true of mental properties; 
they are neither identical to nor supervenient upon physical properties. 
The criteria for correctly applying mental predicates and terms are 
not logically equivalent to the criteria for correctly applying physical 
ones; knowing that the former apply does not entail knowing that the 
latter apply and vice versa. Consequently, mental predicates and terms 
must designate properties distinct from those designated by physical 
predicates and terms.
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The crucial premise in Swinburne’s argument is that terms like ‘red’ 
and ‘pain’ are informative designators, that in applying them we grasp 
the conditions that make redness and pain what they essentially are. The 
obvious challenge to this premise comes from people like Kripke and 
Putnam who have built philosophies of language around examples in 
which competent speakers apply terms correctly while failing to grasp 
the essence of what the terms apply to. The term ‘water’ is an example: 
many people use it correctly to refer to water without knowing that water 
consists of hydrogen and oxygen atoms. Many philosophers are inclined 
to view terms like ‘red’ and ‘pain’ by analogy with ‘water’. We can be 
competent in applying them and making simple inferences to and from 
their application (if something is bright red, then it is red; if something is 
red, then it is coloured, and so on) while yet remaining ignorant of what 
makes them what they are. If that is the case, then Swinburne’s property 
dualism cannot be established a priori, as he claims.
Swinburne acknowledges that ‘water’ is not an informative designator 
in his sense. Prior to discovering that water was H2O, he says, people did 
not fully know what they meant by ‘water’. But, he insists, terms like ‘red’ 
and ‘pain’ are different. Language users who correctly apply these terms 
know the essence of what they refer to. The reason, says Swinburne, 
is that competent speakers who are favourably positioned with their 
faculties working properly and not subject to illusion know when and 
where terms like ‘red’ and ‘pain’ apply, they are able to make simple 
inferences to and from their application, and this kind of competence 
implies knowing what redness and pain are. It certainly seems plausible 
that correctly using a term like ‘red’ implies knowing in some sense what 
red is. If I am a competent speaker, favourably positioned with faculties 
in working order and not subject to illusion, then surely I can identify 
which things in the environment are red. It doesn’t follow from this, 
however, that I know the conditions that are metaphysically necessary 
and sufficient for being red. By analogy, if you tell me that only people 
with a yellow ticket may enter the reception I can pick out the people 
who may enter the reception without knowing what earned them their 
yellow tickets. Being a competent doorman requires only being able to 
identify which people have a  yellow ticket; it does not require me to 
know how or why they got it. Kripke and Putnam give us reason to think 
something analogous is often true of competent speakers.
Swinburne counters this with the suggestion that I  cannot be 
wrong about something looking red to me. But exponents of the 
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Kripke-Putnam view can concede this point. Even if I cannot be wrong 
about something looking red to me, I can still be wrong about something 
being red. One way of developing this idea is to say that terms like ‘red’ 
get their meanings from certain prototypical applications. We apply ‘red’ 
to objects whose surfaces reflect such-and-such wavelengths of light to 
the eyes of such-and-such observers under such-and-such conditions 
(Swinburne countenances some of these conditions with the expression 
‘favourably positioned with faculties in working order and not subject 
to illusion’). Things get called ‘red’ to the extent that they resemble the 
prototypes. Sometimes, however, we find ourselves in circumstances that 
do not satisfy the conditions that define the prototypes; objects look red 
to us that are not ‘really’ red; that is, that we would not call red if we saw 
them in prototypical circumstances (I see your tie in unusual lighting, 
and believe it is red, but recognize my mistake when we enter white 
light). If ‘red’ means something like this, then it is possible that redness 
might be identical to a surface property whose essence we do not know 
even though we can competently use ‘red’ to refer to objects having it. 
Likewise, redness could be a higher-order property such as the property 
of having a surface property that reflects such-and-such wavelengths of 
light in prototypical circumstances. In either case, Swinburne’s property 
dualism does not follow.
I confess that I found it difficult to discern an argument in Mind, Brain, 
and Free Will that would rule out views of this sort. Two considerations 
that Swinburne advances seem to fall short. One is the point mentioned 
earlier that how something looks to people appears to be an extra fact 
about it beyond its having a certain reflectance spectrum. Exponents of 
the Kripke-Putnam view can readily concede this point. When we are 
talking about how things look to us, they can say, we are talking about 
a relation between a surface and an observer as opposed to a property 
of the surface taken by itself. Since relations are not intrinsic properties, 
facts about relations are not facts about intrinsic properties. It does 
not follow from this, however, that redness is not an intrinsic physical 
property, nor that it is not a physical relation.
Second, Swinburne appeals to the kind of argument J.  J.  C. Smart 
attributed to Max Black.1 If ‘red’ and ‘reflecting such-and-such wavelengths 
of light’ are not logically equivalent, as exponents of the Kripke-Putnam 
1 J. J. C. Smart, . ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, in The Philosophy of Mind, V.C. 
Chappell, ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), pp. 160-172.
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account must concede, then the criteria for correctly applying the one 
term cannot be identical to the criteria for correctly applying the other. 
The differences between these criteria must ultimately boil down to 
differences among properties. There must be certain properties whose 
recognition by a  competent speaker underwrites the correct use of 
‘red’, and certain properties whose recognition by a competent speaker 
underwrites the correct use of ‘reflecting such-and-such wavelengths 
of light’. These properties, moreover, must be different, for it must be 
possible for competent speakers to recognize the instantiation of the 
properties that sanction the use of the one term while at the same time 
not recognizing the instantiation of the properties that sanction the use 
of the other. Consequently, it looks as though exponents of the Kripke-
Putnam account must endorse a dualism of properties.
The problem with this argument is that by itself it does not support the 
dualism of physical and nonphysical properties that Swinburne looks to 
defend; it supports only the thesis that the properties which underwrite 
the correct use of ‘red’ must be different from those which underwrite 
the correct use of ‘reflecting such-and-such wavelengths of light’, and 
it does not follow from this alone that the former properties must be 
nonphysical and the latter physical. To appreciate this let us imagine for 
the sake of argument that physicalism is true, and that P1, P2, ... , Pn are 
all the properties that exist. Since physicalism is true by assumption, 
P1, P2, ... , Pn are all physical properties. Suppose now that competent 
speakers apply the predicate ‘is red’ to something if and only if it 
instantiates P1, and that they apply the predicate ‘reflects such-and-such 
wavelengths of light’ to something if and only if it instantiates P2. In that 
case, the properties that competent speakers must recognize to correctly 
apply the one predicate differ from the properties they must recognize 
to correctly apply the other, yet it does not follow that either predicate 
expresses a nonphysical property, for by assumption all properties are 
physical. The dualism that the argument supports is merely a dualism 
of conditions for correctly applying predicates or terms – a difference 
in what some philosophers call ‘modes of presentation’.2 This does not 
by itself support a dualism of physical and nonphysical properties. To 
derive that conclusion a further premise is needed to the effect that the 
2 John Perry, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2001); Ned Block, Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, 
Volume 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: A Bradford Book, 2007), Chapter 21, pp. 435-490.
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properties which fix the referents of terms like ‘red’ must be nonphysical. 
But it is difficult to see how exponents of the argument can endorse such 
a premise without either begging the question against their opponents or 
making tendentious assumptions about properties.3
Swinburne replies that critics who endorse the foregoing line of 
argument end up multiplying entities beyond necessity since modes of 
presentation are extra theoretical posits. But there are two things to say 
in response. First, it is not clear that modes of presentation are in fact 
extra theoretical posits. Modes of presentations are typically posited to 
explain why identity statements such as ‘Cicero is Tully’ are informative 
while identity statements such as ‘Cicero is Cicero’ are not. If properties 
F1, F2, ... , Fn are all of Cicero’s properties, and competent speakers fix the 
referent of ‘Cicero’ by appeal to F1 and the referent of ‘Tully’ by appeal 
to F2, then the informativeness of ‘Cicero is Tully’ has a straightforward 
explanation: it is informative because the referents of ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ 
are fixed by appeal to different properties. Likewise, if F1, F2, ... , Fn are all 
the properties had by the property of redness (Swinburne admits that there 
are properties of properties), then one can explain the informativeness 
of the putative identity statement ‘Redness is reflecting such-and-such 
wavelengths of light’ in an analogous way: competent speakers fix the 
referent of ‘redness’ by appeal to F1, and they fix the referent of ‘reflecting 
such-and-such wavelengths of light’ by appeal to F2. Some philosophers 
choose to call properties like F1 and F2 ‘modes of presentation’. Using 
this terminology does not add anything to the theoretical apparatus they 
must already endorse to make sense of informative identity claims, so 
it is not clear that modes of presentation amount to ‘extra’ theoretical 
posits, as Swinburne claims. Second, there are reasons to think that 
philosophers like Swinburne must themselves be committed to positing 
modes of presentation. Ostensibly any philosophers who want to explain 
informative identity statements must posit such modes or something very 
much like them, and presumably that includes philosophers like Prof. 
Swinburne. In addition, without modes of presentation Black’s argument 
cannot get off the ground, for it requires that different properties fix the 
referents of expressions like ‘red’, on the one hand, and expressions like 
‘reflects such-and-such wavelengths of light’, on the other. This gives us 
reason to think that Swinburne himself must tacitly endorse modes of 
presentation even if he chooses not to call them that.
3 Block (ibid.) argues for this in detail.
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Based on the foregoing considerations it remains unclear how 
Swinburne rules out the Kripke-Putnam view. Consequently, it remains 
unclear why we should accept that terms like ‘red’ and ‘pain’ are 
informative designators in Swinburne’s sense, and as a result it remains 
unclear why we should accept the property dualism Swinburne endorses.
II. SWINBURNE’S ARGUMENT FOR SUBSTANCE DUALISM
Similar worries attend Swinburne’s argument for substance dualism. To 
appreciate this it’s helpful to consider Swinburne’s philosophical forebear, 
Descartes, and the exchange he had with his contemporary Antoine 
Arnauld, author of the fourth set of objections to the Meditations. 
Descartes argued that we could exist without bodies because thought was 
our only essential property. To support this premise Descartes compiled 
a list of the properties that people initially took themselves to have and 
argued that we could clearly and distinctly conceive of ourselves existing 
without each of the properties on the list – each, that is, except thought. 
We cannot form a  (first-personal) conception of ourselves without 
thought, so Descartes concluded that we could not exist without it, and 
since this was the only property of which this was true, it must be our 
only essential property. Arnauld’s worry about Descartes’ argument was 
that the initial conception people had of themselves might be in some 
way impoverished, that people might have properties, perhaps even 
essential ones, of which they were entirely ignorant, and which therefore 
did not appear on Descartes’ list. Since these properties would not have 
been subjected to Descartes’ conceivability test, Descartes’ conclusion 
would not follow; we could have essential properties of which we are 
entirely unaware. Descartes conceded to Arnauld that the conception we 
started with would have to comprise all our essential properties (it would 
have to be ‘complete’ as he put it), but he never explained why we should 
suppose that the conception we have of ourselves is complete in fact.
What was true of Descartes vis-à-vis Arnauld seems true of Swinburne 
vis-à-vis Kripke and Putnam. Kripke and Putnam made it evident that 
Arnauld’s worry was not an abstract possibility; rather, our best concrete 
efforts at understanding the world have revealed that things often have 
properties, including essential ones, of which we can remain entirely 
unaware in our pedestrian dealings, and which for that reason do not 
factor into the meanings of the terms we use to refer to them. Just as it 
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is unclear how Swinburne rules out a Kripke-Putnam account when it 
comes to properties like redness, it is unclear how he rules it out when 
it comes to substances like you and I. He argues that I cannot be wrong 
about what ‘I’ refers to in the way I  can be wrong about what ‘water’ 
refers to:
‘I’ or ‘Richard Swinburne’ as used by me ... seem to be informative 
designators. If I know how to use these words, then ... I can’t be mistaken 
about when to apply them ... I cannot know how to use the word ‘I’ ... and 
still wonder whether it is I or someone else who is having that event ... 
My knowledge of how to use ‘I’, like my knowledge of how to use ‘green’ 
and ‘square’, means that I know the nature of what I am talking about 
when I use the word. (p. 158)
But it is unclear how Swinburne’s conclusion follows from this. Even if 
I am necessarily right about what ‘I’ refers to, I can still be wrong about 
what essential properties I have. (By analogy, I can correctly admit all 
and only the yellow ticket holders while yet incorrectly conjecturing how 
they got the tickets.) It remains unclear, therefore, why we should believe 
that the competent use of ‘I’ implies knowing what I essentially am, and 
as a result it remains unclear how we ought to arrive at the conclusion 
that we are pure mental substances, ones that have only pure mental 
properties essentially.
The work of Arnauld, Kripke, and Putnam points to a  general 
worry that has confronted Cartesian projects like Swinburne’s since the 
seventeenth century. The arguments Cartesians advance typically assume 
that our concepts and the predicates and terms that express them leave 
out nothing essential to the things we think and talk about, that they are 
‘complete’ in Descartes’ sense, and as a result we can know how matters 
stand with regard to ourselves, our bodies, our powers, properties, 
and so on, merely by consulting our language and concepts. It is this 
assumption that Swinburne encapsulates in his claim that ‘red’, ‘pain’, ‘I’, 
and other terms are informative designators, and that I’ve suggested he 
has failed adequately to defend.
The foregoing remarks criticize the idea that mental properties are 
our only essential properties, but are mental properties essential to us 
at all? I confess that I found Swinburne’s argument for this claim rather 
difficult to follow. Its main premises appear to be these:
(1) If humans coexperience conscious mental events of different 
kinds (if, for instance, they simultaneously see the trees outside 
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and smell the coffee brewing), then mental properties determine 
the physical boundaries of a substance.
(2) If mental properties determine the physical boundaries of 
a substance, then they in part determine what physical properties 
that substance has.
(3) If mental properties in part determine what physical properties 
a substance has, then that substance is a mental substance; that is, 
it has mental properties essentially.
The reasoning behind (1) appears to be this: Suppose that I coexperience 
mental events m1 and m2. We know empirically that mental events are 
caused by brain events, so let us suppose that m1 and m2 are caused by 
brain events b1 and b2, respectively. Since m1 and m2 are coexperienced 
by me, the parts of the brain involved in b1 and b2 must both be parts 
of me (if they were not, then the mental events they caused would not 
be coexperienced by one and the same substance as they are by me). 
The mental events I coexperience thus determine at least in part which 
physical things are parts of me. If that is true, then there is good reason to 
endorse premise (2), for if mental properties play a role in determining 
what parts I  have, and those parts have physical properties which are 
attributable to me, then mental properties play a  role in determining 
what physical properties I have as well. But now we come to a sticking 
point. If my mental properties partly determine what physical parts 
I have and hence what physical properties I have, it is still not evident 
how this implies that I  have mental properties essentially, as premise 
(3) claims. To arrive at this conclusion Swinburne must assume that 
I have no physical properties other than those which are determined by 
my mental properties. It is plausible to suppose that I have no physical 
properties other than those which are determined by my physical parts, 
but why should we suppose that the only parts I have are ones which are 
determined by my mental properties? Couldn’t I have parts which are 
mentally irrelevant, which are not involved in events that cause or are 
caused by mental events – hair, fingernails, white blood cells, even parts 
of the nervous system such as glial cells? And couldn’t the continued 
existence of some of these mentally irrelevant parts be sufficient for my 
continued existence (as some animalists claim about the brainstem)? 
I couldn’t discern an argument in Mind, Brain, and Free Will that would 
rule this out, so it remains unclear why we should accept premise (3), and 
hence why we should accept that we have mental properties essentially.
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III. PHYSICAL PHENOMENA AND STRUCTURE
A  final point concerns Swinburne’s notion of bodies and physical 
phenomena generally. A substance is mental according to Swinburne if it 
has mental properties essentially, and it is physical otherwise. This might 
strike some readers as a rather odd way of defining ‘physical’, for suppose 
that I am a ghostly being made of ectoplasm with properties that physics 
cannot even in principle describe, and that I have mental properties but 
only contingently (when, say, the ectoplasm achieves a certain state). By 
Swinburne’s definition I count as a physical substance (and not a mental 
one) despite having no properties at all that can be described by physics. 
The reason for this odd result is that for Swinburne being physical has 
nothing to do with physics. His definition is like the Amish definition 
of ‘English’. For the Amish, being English has nothing to do with being 
from England; it is simply not being Amish. Likewise, for Swinburne 
being physical is simply not being essentially mental. This is awkward 
for philosophers who are careful to distinguish biological, chemical, and 
other special scientific properties from physical ones (just as I imagine 
the Amish use of ‘English’ must be awkward for people who are careful to 
distinguish the Welsh, the Scottish, and others from the English).
This definitional point is important because I think it reveals a general 
tendency to overlook important distinctions within the natural world. For 
Swinburne, as for many other Cartesians, there is nothing about human 
bodies that would set them apart as special denizens of the physical 
universe. Contrast this with a view (one might call it a contemporary 
hylomorphic view) which claims that structure is a basic ontological and 
explanatory principle, one that concerns both what things essentially are 
and what they can do. Put a human in a leak-proof bag and then squash 
it with several tons of force. The contents of the bag no longer include 
a human being, nor can those contents think, feel, and act as they once 
could. What explains the difference pre- and post-squashing? Since the 
physical materials remain the same (none leaked out) we want to say 
that what changed was simply the way those materials were organized or 
structured, that this organization or structure was responsible not only 
for there being a human before the squashing, but also for that human 
having the distinctive capacities it had. A view along these lines has some 
empirical backing, as William Bechtel, a philosopher of neuroscience, 
observes:
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[T]he organization of ... components typically integrates them into 
an  entity that has an  identity of its own ... Organization itself is not 
something inherent in the parts ...  Accordingly, investigators who 
already understand in detail how the parts behave are often surprised 
by what happens when they are organized in particular ways ... In 
virtue of being organized systems, mechanisms do things beyond what 
their components do ... Not only can one study the performance of 
a mechanism without knowing its component parts and their operations, 
but what the mechanism as a  whole does is typically quite different 
than the operations performed by its parts ...  As a  result, organized 
mechanisms become the focus of relatively autonomous disciplines ... 
This autonomy maintains that psychology and other special sciences 
study phenomena that are outside the scope of more basic sciences.4
According to Bechtel, a complex whole – what he calls a ‘mechanism’ – 
such as an organism, has an organization that confers on it capacities 
that are not had by its parts taken in isolation, and that cannot be 
reductively explained in terms of lower-level sciences. His work and that 
of others suggest that our best empirical descriptions and explanations 
of living behaviour posit organization (or structure, arrangement, order, 
configuration) as a basic ontological and explanatory principle.
Swinburne concedes that wholes are composed of parts arranged 
in certain ways, and that parts sometimes behave differently when 
incorporated into larger wholes. ‘Nevertheless,’ he says, ‘the causal 
properties of larger substances such as organisms are just the causal 
properties of their parts ... ’ (p. 32) For Swinburne, arrangement makes 
no causal difference to things. It might be an ontological principle insofar 
as it is in part what makes a whole what it is, but it is not an explanatory 
principle on Swinburne’s view since it does not confer any powers on 
a whole beyond those conferred by its parts. Swinburne is not alone in 
thinking this. His position is the norm among Cartesians and also among 
physicalists. Yet if the hylomorphic alternative just described is viable, it 
could relieve some of the anxieties that motivate both substance dualism 
and physicalism, for it implies an antireductionism that preserves what 
is special about human existence without denying humans’ essential 
4 William Bechtel, ‘Reducing Psychology while Maintaining its Autonomy via 
Mechanistic Explanations’, in The Matter of the Mind, Maurice Schouten and Looren 
de Jong, Huib, eds. (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), pp. 172-198 (pp. 174, 
185-186).
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materiality.5 Distinctively human traits, it says, are due to our distinctively 
human structures, structures that are nevertheless essentially embodied 
in physical materials. And since structures are basic ontological and 
explanatory principles on the hylomorphic view, ones that confer powers 
on a thing beyond those conferred by its composing materials, the view 
is robustly antireductive. Seen by comparison with a view like this, the 
project of trying to preserve human distinctiveness by denying essential 
human materiality begins to lose some of its appeal.
There is clearly a  great deal more to be said on this point and on 
Mind, Brain, and Free Will in general, but I hope what I’ve said is enough 
to contribute in a small way to a further discussion of Swinburne’s work.
5 I  take what is special about human existence to include eschatological factors. 
Elsewhere, for instance, I’ve argued that a contemporary hylomorphic view is compatible 
with the doctrine of the resurrection; see my ‘Hylomorphism and Resurrection’, European 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 5 (2013), 197-224.
